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ORGANIZING THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
NEGOTIATIONS 
William L.R Felstiner* 
DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPEC-
TIVE. By P.H. Gulliver. New York: Academic Press. 1979. Pp. xxii, 
293. $19. 
P.H. Gulliver is a first-rate ethnographer. His work on the 
Ndendeuli and Arusha of Tanzania is among the best and best 
known research in the anthropology of law since World War 11. 1 
Since leaving the School of Oriental and African Studies at London 
in the early 1970s, he has made a considerable effort to explore the 
abstract reaches of mediation and negotiation as a form of dispute 
processing.2 That effort is capped by Disputes and Negotiations, the 
first volume in a series of Studies on Law and Social Control edited 
by Donald Black. 
Disputes and Negotiations first evaluates many earlier efforts to 
distinguish negotiation from adjudication. I hope that its sweep and 
wisdom will put an end to a definitional exchange that is beginning 
to rival the struggle over the definition of law that plagued the pre-
ceding generation of political anthropologists. Gulliver argues that 
what distinguishes the two is the adjudicator's power to determine an 
outcome, and not whether the dispute concerns interests or values, 
zero sum or other results, multiplex or other relationships, or judicial 
or political process. This is also the dividing line that I suggested 
years ago. 3 Of course, in one sense no definition of any social phe-
nomenon can be correct or incorrect since definitions simply stand 
for what they are said to represent. If Professor X wishes to charac-
terize dispute processing that produces zero-sum results as adjudica-
tion, and all other forms as something else, he cannot be labeled 
wrong in doing so. At worst, he has seriously increased the risks of 
misunderstanding because his definition excludes a considerable 
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amount of behavior that is generally thought to be adjudication, and 
includes a considerable amount that is not. The claim, then, that can 
be made for the definition proposed by Gulliver et al. is that it ap-
pears to include all of the behavior that in folk understanding would 
be considered to be adjudication and nothing more . 
.Disputes and Negotiations is not about negotiations at large,. but 
about the negotiation of disputes. Gulliver defines disputes as dis-
agreements that are transferred to a public domain. But what is a 
public domain, and what is the purpose in restricting the analysis of 
negotiations to those that involve an undefined public? It would be 
hard to derive an operational definition of public domain from the 
way in which Gulliver dances around the issue: Public is contrasted 
with private and dyadic. It "offers the possibility of appealing to 
other people and to the interests and norms of the community" (p. 
75) (emphasis added). "There is, in effect, an announcement that 
there is disagreement" (p. 76) (emphasis added). There need not be 
a third party. "There is some kind of public recognition and cogni-
zance of the matter" (p. 76) (emphasis added). But is the disagree-
ment public if the disputants hire lawyers or consult a ·parish priest 
or a marriage counselor or the Better Business Bureau? Or, in this 
country, must parties tum to a government functionary or institution 
which publicizes its activity before their disagreement becomes a dis-
pute? More important, I do not understand why Gulliver wants to 
restrict his "models" of negotiations in this way. To do so throws out 
the greater portion of the universe of negotiations and does so, if I 
understand the book, needlessly. With the unimportant exception 
that "private" negotiations may not require a forum since they can 
be conducted by mail or telephone, all of Gulliver's abstractions and 
analyses are as applicable to private as to public disagreements. 
After these preliminaries, .Disputes and Negotiations has a simple 
theme, richly and intelligently embroidered. Negotiations exhibit 
two patterns - an overall sequence and a constant cycle that is re-
peated within each stage of the overall sequence. Gulliver asserts 
that the eight stages of this sequence apply to negotiations about dis-
putes regardless of who the disputants are, what the disputes are 
about, whether the disputes are processed ad hoc or according to a 
predetermined and fixed regime, or within whatever cultural settings 
the disputes occur. 
A run-of-the-mill American negotiator would be surprised by 
two, at most, of Gulliver's eight phases even if he had never been to 
Africa or to graduate school. The obvious stages are fixing a place to 
meet, composing agenda by way of defining issues, making claims, 
narrowing differences, and reaching and executing an agreement. 
The order of these stages is equally unremarkable. To negotiate, one 
must communicate, and if that is to be done in person, the first step 
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must be getting the disputants to the same place at the same time. 
Once there, the disputants must talk about what they are going to 
talk about, say what they want or are willing to do, attempt to ac-
commodate their differences, reach or fail to reach an agreement, 
and carry out or ignore the duties imposed by any agreement. 
To these necessary stages Gulliver adds two others: "Prelimi-
naries to Final Bargaining" and "Ritual Affirmation." The first is 
simply an early stage of bargaining in which issues are simplified, 
trade-offs are made, and general formulae for settlement may be 
constructed. Since Gulliver notes that this stage does not always oc-
cur, it is not entirely clear why he has bothered to formulate it as a 
stage separate from bargaining proper. No analytic capital is made 
of the distinction. Ritual Affirmation is the ceremony of success, 
stretching from kiss to beer drink to recorded deed. Because such 
rituals have greater symbolic importance in tribal culture, where dis-
putes tend to be between familiars, anthropologists have paid more 
attention to them than have students of negotiations in the United 
States. Gulliver's suggestion that a written agreement, in addition to 
its instrumental uses, fulfills a strong psychological need for sym-
bolic recognition of completed negotiations is worth further atten-
tion. 
Within each stage, Gulliver posits a reactive cycle of information 
exchange and learning. Gulliver examines the range and complexity 
of this interaction through detailed attention to several activities -
the receipts of information from the opponent and third parties, the 
manner in which such information is perceived and assessed, the re-
ciprocal influences of the digested information and the disputant's 
strategic goals, the expectations of the other side's behavior, and the 
evaluation of issues and outcomes - all of which lead to a specific 
tactical decision and a similar half-cycle of information processing 
and decision making by the other side. 
In this section - in fact throughout the book - Gulliver takes 
great pains to demonstrate that a chasm separates the utility max-
imization models of game and bargaining theorists from the universe 
of real people tonducting real negotiations.4 He is, no doubt, both 
correct and effective in exposing the dimensions of this gap, but most 
of the effort strikes me as something of an attack on a battalion of 
straw men. I admit to knowing little about game theory. Like the 
coal miner in Beyond the Fringe5 who did not have the Latin for the 
judging, I do not have the math for it. But I know, and I know that 
Gulliver knows, that these models were not intended to capture the 
richness of conventional negotiations. The crucial question, rather, 
is whether deductions from these models will ever provide useful in-
4. Pp. 89, 91-93, 95. 
5. Beyond the Fringe, Sitting on the Bench (phonograph recording, ca. 1962). 
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sights about such negotiations. Gulliver believes that they have,6 
and he might better have left his discussion of these abstract theories 
at that simple point. 
Gulliver's preoccupation with the shortcomings of game theory 
leads me to the central question of this review - that is, what is 
Disputes and Negotiations all about, whom will it help to do what? I 
get the impression that this is a question unresolved in Gulliver's 
own mind. In some places he is very careful. The book contains 
many caveats about the use of its propositions: 
The developmental model of negotiation ... is a generalized, ideal-
type mode constructed after reality. It was not intended, as it stands, to 
describe or to be rigidly applied to any particular case of negotiations 
(p. 170-71). 
The cyclical process, then, is much less tidy in practice than the model 
can indicate (p. 115). 
The models . . . provide a tentative, working paradigm based as far as 
possible on real-life conditions and aimed at improving understanding 
of those conditions (p. 265). 
My models, or paradigms, are intended as something like a first ap-
proximation, and there is no reason to think that my own particular 
approach and the emphasis it gives to certain kinds of factors will pro-
vide a complete treatment of negotiation (p. 265). 
Yet in other places Gulliver is much less modest: the book presents 
"an operational scheme of analysis that purports to help explain the 
causes of convergence upon an outcome of negotiation" (p. 200); it 
offers "analytical tools with which to approach the closer examina-
tion of power in particular cases" (p. 207); and it provides an "im-
proved understanding so as to develop more generalized, theoretical 
propositions" (p. 207). 
Gulliver constructs what might be called weak models: that is, 
they approximate the phenomena of which they are a representation 
as closely as possible. Gulliver's models simplify and abstract only 
by eliminating the tendency of real situations to be repetitive, incom-
plete, and disorderly, and by omitting certain general categories of 
disputes - those involving more than two parties and those carried 
on privately. Even these simplifications strike me as grudging. Gul-
liver would like to incorporate all alternative forms of behavior into 
each of his stages and cycles. But recognizing such an effort as the 
path to excesses of complication and confusion, he is content with a 
liberal sprinkling of contingencies qualified by "sometimes," "usu-
ally," "frequently," and "not always." 
These weak models, which are at times also called ideal types, 
are not used to develop testable hypotheses, as models and ideal 
types generally are. I do not want to overstate the argument. Dis-
6. P. 43. 
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pules and Negotiations does contain an occasional hypothesis. Gul-
liver postulates, for instance, that a mediator is most useful during 
the transition from one phase of negotiations to another, and that 
disputant attempts to cut short the overall sequence can lead to de-
lays and breakdowns in negotiations. But for the most part, Disputes 
and Negotiations is ·atheoretical in that it provides a way to record 
behavior, but does not attempt to explain it. Nor does Gulliver pre-
dict, from a general framework, particular phenomena that research-
ers can look for in new studies. The developmental stages and 
repetitive cycles within stages that characterize negotiations are like 
many other stage and cycle sets. Animals, for instance, develop from 
fetus through birth, youth, maturity, and old age to death while ex-
periencing shorter-term cycles of eating, sleeping, playing, and mat-
ing. The valuable contributions, it seems to me, are made, on the 
one hand, by those who record the behavior of specific animals or 
animal groups and, on the other, by those who use these empirical 
records either to explain the differences between animals or animal 
groups, or to identify the mechanisms that control those observed 
patterns that are common to many groups. An abstraction of stages 
and cycles which does not directly lead to explanation is useful only 
to the degree that it is not obvious. In that event, it can provide a 
new opportunity to order data and develop causal explanations. In 
this view, Gulliver's stages and information sharing cycles are more 
an elaborate tour de force demonstrating how to organize an empiri-
cal record of negotiations than they are a major contribution promis-
ing to explain observed behavior. 
The limited analytic utility of Gulliver's conceptualization is sug-
gested by the two case studies with which the book concludes. Of 
course, the recital of these cases, an Arushan land dispute and an 
American labor dispute, shows how close a fit there is between Gul-
liver's stages and cycles and the evolution of real disputes. I say "of 
course" because the model was developed from these and similar 
cases in the first place. Gulliver analyzes and compares these cases 
with considerable insight and imagination. In case analysis he has 
few equals among anthropologists. But that analysis, in the sense of 
explaining why negotiations proceeded as they did, is unaided by the 
stages and cycles model. 
I will try to be precise. The Arushan dispute was between neigh-
bors who each claimed title to a parcel of land that lay between their 
farms. They also complained about wandering goats, interruptions 
in the supply of irrigation water, child beating, trespass, crop and 
irrigation works damage, slander, and an illicit supernatural act. 
The disputants were joined in the moot by their lineage counselors 
and a set of patrilineal supporters. Although negotiations involving 
so many issues and actors are obviously complicated, Gulliver's sys-
tem of developmental stages enables him to describe them efficiently. 
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Gulliver also identifies some of the reasons that the settlement took 
its eventual form: 
(a) D 1 was willing to overlook the slander because his age mates as-
sured him that they did not believe it. 
(b) Dl insisted on public acknowledgement of his water rights be-
cause of recent changes in his agricultural practices. 
(c) D2 became unwilling to acknowledge Dl's water rights when he 
saw that public opinion on this issue was against him. 
( d) D l's group had divided doubts about the validity of his claim to 
the disputed land. 
(e) D2 was very proud of the workmanship in his irrigation gate and 
D 1 did not recognize the importance of these feelings. 
(f) D2 was stubborn about any ritual performance because of (e). 
(g) The last break through was achieved through the efforts of mem-
bers of both parties who were not closely related to the disputants. 
Gulliver's insights into the dynamics of settlement come from exter-
nal information about the disputants' objectives and the context of 
the dispute and from the structure of the moot. They do not seem to 
me to depend at all on his descriptive organization of the negotia-
tions into developmental stages. 
That the model is a useful tool in describing complicated dispute 
negotiations is clear. That it does not help explain success, failure, or 
the outcome ingredients of negotiations is not because Gulliver's is a 
first effort that requires further elaboration and will mature with ex-
panded use. Despite his disclaimers on these grounds, Gulliver pro-
vides a rich and detailed stage and cycles model put together with 
considerable ingenuity and good sense. The flaw, I think, is in the 
design of the enterprise rather than in its execution. 
